Battle for Fallujah After Action Report Excerpts

The following excerpts are from "RCT-1 Fires in the Battle of Fallujah", Field Artillery Journal, November-December 2005.

• The 1st Mar Div Regimental Combat Team-1's (RCT-1's) Field Artillery had the primary mission of counterfire throughout the tour in Iraq, including in Operation Al Fajr. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (A/1/11), M/4/14 and A/3-82 FA all fired counterfire missions in support of RCT-1.
• From 11 September to 31 December 2004, RCT-1's ad hoc counterfire cell in the FSCC {Fire Support Coordination Center} tracked 6,098 radar acquisitions. Of those counterbattery acquisitions, 452 were confirmed as valid indirect fire attacks. During this time the FSCC cleared M/4/14 and A/3-82 FA to fire 310 counterbattery fire missions for a total of 2,480 artillery rounds…these missions suppressed the enemy's indirect fire activities and prevented him from adjusting them onto multinational forces and forward operating bases they occupied.
• During the fighting in November and December 2004, the FSCC cleared 76 artillery call-for-fire missions…totaling 1,898 artillery rounds.
• The TPC {Target Processing Center} section processed 3,300 acquisitions. 3-82 FA fired 172 of the acquisitions for a total of 1,280 rounds.
• Throughout Operation Al Fajr, Battery M stood ready with six howitzers 24 hours a day, providing RCT-1 continuous fire support. More than 50 percent of the missions were fired danger close to friendly forces maneuvering in and around the city while in contact with the enemy.

The following excerpts are from "The Fight For Fallujah: After Action Review for the Battle for Fallujah TF 2-2 in FSE AAR," Field Artillery Journal, March - April 2005.

• The artillery was used in doctrinal roles, such as screening the initial point of penetration, preparatory fires, close fire support and disruptive deep fires, as well as in non-doctrinal roles, such as clearing routes of IEDs and breeching minefields.
• As an organic part of the Task Force (TF), the howitzers provided accurate, timely fires throughout the fight, delivering 925 rounds, mostly in danger-close fires.
• We routinely had 155-mm and 120-mm fires within 200 meters of friendly forces.
• Using Paladins directly attached to the TF gave us a tremendous advantage in the fight. Our tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) were effective and lethal and gave maneuver TFs greater flexibility, firepower and mobility.
• While it did not impact our operations overall, at times the physical and psychological effects of massed artillery fires were the preferred effects…additional 155-mm howitzers would have been more effective.
• A big lesson is that CAS was not a substitute for responsive artillery and mortars.
• Munitions brought to the Fight: 155-mm high-explosive M107 (short-range) and M795 (long-range) rounds, illumination and white phosphorous (WP, M110 and M825), with point-detonating (PD) delay, time and variable-time (VT) fuzes. The munitions at our disposal gave us excellent flexibility.
• During the course of the battle, more than 2,000 artillery and mortar rounds were fired.
• The contributions of indirect fires were a decisive part of the Battle of Fallujah and contributed tremendously to the outcome of the fight. They allowed the maneuver forces to rapidly move through the city with minimum casualties and demonstrated what a joint and combined arms team can do…What jumped to the forefront was infantry and tank platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders telling us that the artillery and mortars were awesome.